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Abstract   In traditional aesthetics, the typical characteristic of 
aesthetic experience is said to be pure disinterested beauty. 
However, the discussion based on this notion is burdened with the 
philosophical background assumptions of German idealism. In his 
Art as Experience John Dewey challenged the classical 
philosophical tradition and presented the key ideas for developing a 
new concept of aesthetic experience. In order to understand his 
pragmatist notion of aesthetic experience it is necessary to discuss a 
number of topics concerning pragmatist the challenge to classical 
philosophy. The philosophical naturalism of pragmatism questions 
the traditional distinction between the changing empirical world and 
the mind-independent real world as an object of genuine knowledge. 
There is only one world and we are in it. Dewey’s naturalism is, 
however, in important respects different from the main trend in 
contemporary naturalism. Further, the pragmatist conception of 
experience must be clearly distinguished from the traditional notion 
of experience as sense experience. Action and practice are modes of 
experiencing and understanding the world. The third topic concerns 
the naturalistic denial of any immaterial substances. The mind is 
necessarily embodied, but this is not enough to remove the classical 
dichotomy between internal and external. A fourth questionable 
dichotomy in classical philosophy is related to this: the sharp 
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distinction between reason and experience. The pragmatist notion of 
meaning undermines this dualism. This notion of meaning also 
serves as a basis for understanding Dewey’s comments on the 
meanings typical in art. Finally, the emotionally expressive power of 
art requires an explanation. A discussion of all these points helps to 
clarify the character of the pragmatist notion of aesthetic experience 
developed below. 
 
1. Philosophical naturalism 
 
Generally speaking naturalism maintains that human beings are live 
creatures. The question stemming from the 1900th century is the 
following: What has to be changed in philosophy if Charles Darwin 
is right? One sure thing is that there is no longer room for any 
absolutely a priori method for attaining eternal timeless truths about 
the genuine object of knowledge, about the real world as opposed 
the experienced world. Willard van Orman Quine put it quite clearly 
by saying that epistemology is just a chapter in empirical 
psychology. He understands psychology as a branch of natural 
science, and ended up with reductionism in his philosophy of mind 
and an emphasis on brain research. Quine’s naturalism relies on hard 
natural scientific methods. 
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John Dewey’s naturalism can be called soft naturalism as 
distinguished from Quine’s hard naturalism (Määttänen 2006). 
According to Dewey, culture is a product of nature. He viewed 
science as problem solving. Naturalism involves no a priori 
commitment to the methods of natural science. Any method can be 
used if there is reason to assume that using it may produce 
information that helps to solve the problem at hand. The point of 
agreement between hard and soft naturalism is the conviction that 
classical epistemology is based on outdated metaphysical 
assumptions. 
 
The way out of these assumptions is the conception that there is only 
one world, and we are in it. The world is causally closed. This 
entails that everything in the world proceeds through physical causal 
processes. There is no room for any immaterial consciousness 
having an effect on the causal processes. Mind is necessarily 
embodied. However, as we shall see in section 3, this does not 
necessarily entail that cognition must be reduced to brain processes. 
What does follow is that all questions concerning the character of 
cognition are ultimately empirical questions. This is not to 
underestimate the need for abstract conceptual analysis, the 
traditional task of philosophers; but all abstract conceptions must 
have some connection to experience in order to be relevant for the 
scientific study of cognition. 
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2. Experience and the object of knowledge in pragmatism 
 
The traditional view in philosophy is that experience is sense 
perception. Sense organs function as channels through which the 
internal mind observes the external world. Visual perception has 
dominated the discussion since it was discovered that the eye 
functions like a camera obscura. The retinal image was thought to 
continue to the brain and to change into a mental image. Other 
senses were analysed in a similar manner. The object of knowledge 
in this kind of approach is the external world as the hidden cause of 
perceptions. The hidden causes as such cannot, of course, be 
perceived, and therefore the task of the experiencing subject is to 
find out what we can really know about these hidden causes. They 
form the mind-independent real world that we must come to know. 
This task is an issue even in the present day philosophy of science. 
 
According to Charles Peirce the pragmatist conception of experience 
is broader than that of sense experience (CP 1.336). Action and 
practice are forms of experiencing and understanding the world. 
This is a major change in the notion of experience. In pragmatism 
the world is not experienced in the form of individual objects having 
certain qualities and mutual relations. The world is experienced as 
possibilities for action. The object of experience is not the perceived 
world but the objective conditions of action. These conditions are, of 
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course, observed, but they do more: they shape our action (more 
about this in section 4). 
 
Action as a mode of experience changes the former emphasis on 
hidden causes of perception to the possible future consequences of 
action. The static view of what is perceived here and now is changed 
to a dynamic view about what we will perceive if we, in a situation 
like this, perform certain acts. Life involves orienting to the future 
on the ground of past experience. The classical conception of two 
worlds, the empirical world and the real world as a hidden cause of 
perceptions, is changed into the view that there is only one world but 
there is still a problematic relation between what is perceived and 
what is hidden. The hidden world just is not hidden in principle. The 
future is hidden now, but on the basis of past experience we are able 
to control the kinds of experiences we will encounter in the future if 
we perform certain acts. 
 
In pragmatism the object of knowledge is thus defined in a different 
way. The classical epistemic relation between perceptions and their 
hidden causes is replaced by a relation between two situations: the 
one we are in at a certain moment and the other that is a 
consequence of our activities. As Dewey put it, the guided processes 
of change form the objects of knowledge (Dewey 1958, 160). 
 
Anticipation of the future is based on experience, which is a 
complex thing. Evolution has given us a history experience of 
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interacting with our environment. This interaction has shaped us as 
biological organisms. The ultimate reason for our having these 
organs is the fact that they have made it possible to stay alive on 
earth. It is also reasonable to believe that some of our inborn 
capacities, for example the capacity to learn natural languages, are at 
least partly an outcome of the evolutionary pressures created by the 
social and cultural environment of our ancestors. According to 
Merlin Donald, symbols are a product of thought, not vice versa 
(Donald 2001, 276), and these cognitive capacities must have 
developed independently of the ability to use language. Conscious 
human thought has its origin in the complex social organization of 
primates. To this we have to add the experience accumulated during 
historical and cultural development. Each new individual faces the 
task of adopting the skills made possible by this multilevel and 
ultimately long evolutionary experience. It is obvious that the 
number of possible learning histories is enormous. 
 
The possibilities for action that open up in the future form a no less 
complicated scenario. There are always several options for action 
and their different combinations. And the number of possibilities 
depends on the number of skills one has adopted on the basis of our 
shared experiential background. The growing complexity of the 
social and cultural environment increases the number of possible 
actions. An adequate analysis of this complex situation requires a 
dynamic approach where the emphasis is not on what we observe 
here and now but on what to do on the basis of past experience in an 
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observed situation. This pragmatist definition of the object of 
knowledge also has consequences concerning the relation between 
facts and values (section 6.1). 
3. Embodied mind 
 
Naturalism entails that mind is necessarily embodied. The brain is 
the organ of thought, which is probably why the mind is sometimes 
identified with the brain. Naturalism does not, however, necessarily 
imply this identification. Nature is causally closed, but there are 
other physical causal processes besides the brain processes that may 
be involved in thinking. The brain is the organ of thought but it is 
not the brain that thinks. A human being thinks with the brain. Just 
as the legs are the organs of running but it is not the legs that run. A 
human being runs with the legs. The brain in a vat will think exactly 
as well as a pair of legs cut off from a body will run. The conception 
that mind can be identified with or reduced to the brain is a peculiar 
form of neo-Cartesianism. What René Descartes said about the soul, 
is said about the brain (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 103-107). The 
doctrine of two substances, the material and the mental, is rejected, 
but the internal/external dichotomy remains. And the so-called hard 
problem of consciousness also remains: how and why we have 
subjective phenomenal experiences and what their relation is to 
brain processes? This problem has its roots in the external/internal 
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dichotomy that, however, is not the only way to approach the 
problem of cognition. 
 
An obvious but not so thoroughly investigated possibility is that the 
ability to think is not attributed to the brain and not even to the body 
as a whole but to the system of interaction between an organism and 
its natural and social environment. John Dewey criticized in 1896 
the reflex arc concept and suggested that a concept of a sensorimotor 
circuit might do better (Dewey 1975a). The difference between an 
arc and a circuit is precisely in the role of the environment. The 
objects of environment belong to “the functional organization of 
mind” (Määttänen 1993, 105). In this approach, mind is constituted 
by the interaction of an organism and its environment. This changes 
the hard problem of consciousness. Phenomenal qualities are real 
relations between biological organisms and their physical 
environment. They are qualities of concrete interaction. The 
subjective aspect of experience is based on the fact that mind is 
embodied and that the body determines one’s viewpoint. 
 
Interaction consists of action and perception. They are not so easily 
distinguished. Peirce writes that in perception the world’s effect on 
us is greater that our effect on it, while in action it is the other way 
round (CP 1.324). In this way, action and perception form a circuit 
or a loop where all proceeds through physical causal processes. The 
basic principle of naturalism, the principle of causal closure, remains 
in force. This loop of perception and action is a unit of analysis 
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within which it makes sense to speak about experiencing the world 
as possibilities of action on the basis of the experience of past 
interactions. Present experience extends behind the immediately 
perceived because past experience enables one to anticipate the 
consequences of possible courses of action. This unit of analysis is 
also the framework for defining the pragmatist notion of meaning 
that explains how the world is experienced as a meaningful 
environment. 
4. The notion of meaning in pragmatism 
 
The minimum requirement of something having meaning is 
cognitive distance. Meanings enable one to think about something 
that is not immediately present. Language is a system of symbols 
and a powerful vehicle for thought. However, the pragmatist notion 
of meaning is wider. It covers both linguistic meanings and tacit 
(non-linguistic) meanings. 
4.1 Habit of action as meaning 
 
According to Peirce, what a thing means is simply what habits it 
involves (CP 5.400). What are habits of action? A habit is formed 
when a similar action is repeated in similar circumstances. The 
outcome of this repetition is a structure or scheme of action that has 
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the tendency to be reproduced in the future. Habits of action thus 
enable one to anticipate that habitual action in similar circumstances 
tends to produce similar experiences as in the past. All that is 
required is a memory trace about the course of events during the past 
activities. This takes place by virtue of a habit formation mechanism 
that I have called the pragmatist law of association (Määttänen 
2007). The classical laws of association (similarity, proximity in 
time or place and causality) are not enough.  The basis of association 
is the fact that in habit formation action must be accommodated to 
objective conditions of action. Classical laws of association concern 
internal units, and the associations are supposed to be created 
literally in the mind (or the brain). But the pragmatist law of 
association concerns the association of individual acts into a habitual 
series of acts. Associations are formed during and because of overt 
activity. These associative chains make anticipation possible. The 
anticipation of probable future events on the basis of what is 
observed and what possibilities of action the situation provides is, in 
effect, to have cognitive distance. One is able to think about 
something that is not here and now but somewhere else at another 
time. In other words, one is able to think about the future 
consequences of action. Habits thus fulfill the minimum requirement 
of being meaningful. 
 
What are tacit (non-linguistic) meanings? Any object of perception 
may involve habits. This makes it a sign-vehicle that carries 
meanings. Most of us have the habit of using the door and not the 
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window when exiting a room. Doors and windows have thus 
different meaning for us. A door refers to certain experiences that 
we have had and probably will have when using doors. And our 
evolutionary experience warns us strongly against using a window 
for exiting a room. Chairs, tables, hammers, buildings and so on 
have different meanings. As we shall see in section 5, the same also 
holds for individual qualities. The world experienced as possibilities 
of action is a world full of meanings that make it possible to think 
about the consequences of different habitual activities and their 
combinations. Note that there is no mention of language. The 
Peircean definition of meaning can be applied to animal cognition 
and as an account of tacit (non-verbal) meanings as a basis for 
linguistic meaning. 
 
Meanings are also supposed to be general. For Peirce habits are 
general, but in what sense? Habits exist as repeated similar activity 
in similar circumstances, as modes or forms of practices. Peirce 
approached the problem of generality by asking when does 
generality arise. In the past there can be only a certain number of 
acts, and no genuine generality can be involved. Therefore the so-
called real generals (or universals) cannot exist in the past. The same 
holds for the present because only one act can be performed at one 
time. The only possibility left is the future. Peirce writes that a 
general fact cannot be fully realized. It is potential and its “mode of 
being is esse in futuro” (CP 2.148). Peirce says the same thing about 
meanings (CP 5.427). This implies that general things like meanings 
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can only be objects of thought. One can only think of repeating 
instances of a habit indefinitely many times in indefinite future. But 
this does not imply any theory of two different substances, mental 
and material, because all acts are performed in nature, in the material 
world. Generality exists as repeatable habitual behaviour, generality 
is continuous activity as Kant put it (stetige Handlund, Kant 1926, 
615). Habits as meanings are thus general entities and also in this 
sense capable of being vehicles of cognition. 
 
What is it to think with habits? Peirce compares it with listening to a 
melody or a musical phrase. One certainly hears only one note at a 
time but the listening experience is different. On the basis of what is 
already heard, one anticipates how the phrase might continue. The 
phrase is an object of perception or of thought as a whole even 
though the actual listening or thinking is a temporal process. This is 
analogous with thinking about habitual action. Accordingly, thought 
“is a thread of melody running through the succession of our 
sensations” (CP 5. 395). We think of habitual behavior by 
anticipating the future course of action on the basis of past 
experience and by observing changes in environmental conditions. 
The pragmatist law of association provides the mechanisms for this. 
4.2 Language and meaning 
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A traditional way of putting the question of linguistic meaning is to 
ask by virtue of what does a sequence of letters, ‘table’, refer to all 
the tables in the world. This way of putting the question temps one 
to think that the word has a specific capacity, called intentionality, 
for referring to something else. Franz Brentano used this concept in 
psychology and defined mental states as intentional entities having 
that capacity. Brentano used the analogy between words and mental 
states. This analogy temps one to think that ideas (thoughts, mental 
representations) are individual units in the mind. 
 
As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) write, this Cartesian 
idea is based on a container metaphor. The familiarity of the 
metaphor makes the idea easy to understand and easy to adopt. 
Unfortunately it is also based on the outdated metaphysics of two 
different substances and keeps the external/internal dichotomy in 
force. Further, in pragmatist analysis meanings and thoughts are 
relations. Experience consists of a complex system of relations that 
are realized in the interaction between an organism and its natural 
and cultural environment. Relations don’t have well defined 
locations and it would be a logical category error to reduce a relation 
to one of its elements. 
 
From a pragmatist point of view this way of putting the question is 
misleading. A better way to approach the problem of linguistic 
meaning is to point out that we have two types of activities. We do 
something with linguistic expression and then we have other kinds 
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of practical activities. A better question is to ask about the 
relationship between these activities. This is how John Dewey put it. 
The word ‘hat’ gains meaning in the same way as a hat, namely by 
being used in a certain way (Dewey 1916, 18). There is a clear 
analogy between the use of language and the use of other things, 
hats, tools and so on. Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously applied 
the principle that meaning is use, also refers to this analogy 
(Wittgenstein 1975, 21). Peircean pragmatism goes further. The 
relationship between the use of language and the use of tools is more 
than an analogy. The use of tools and other objects of perception 
creates meaning structures independently of language. Accurately 
speaking Wittgenstein’s principle is an application of Peirce’s wider 
definition: what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. The 
use of a linguistic expression surely belongs to the habits involved. 
Habits of use form a subcategory of all the habits involved. 
 
  There are two systems of meanings functioning according to the 
same principle: meanings are habits of action. One is the system of 
linguistic meanings and the other is the system of tacit (non-
linguistic) meanings. Language as a system of groups and strings of 
letters gains its meanings when it is used in the context of other 
practices that are meaningful in their own right. Consistent 
naturalism requires a bottom-up strategy. Tacit meanings are 
primary and basic. Merlin Donald is right in maintaining that 
symbols are the product of thought. What is the origin of thought? 
The pragmatist answer is: it is in the development of tacit meanings, 
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habits of action as ways of surviving in nature. Another point 
concerning the priority of tacit meanings is conventionality. 
Meanings of words are conventional in the sense that the physical 
properties of words are needed only for the purpose of noticing 
differences between words. They do not restrict the possible 
meanings. In tacit meanings things are different. The physical 
properties of the sign-vehicles, tools, tales, houses and so on and the 
properties of the agents, human beings as biological organisms, do 
restrict the possible habits involved and, therefore, the possible 
meanings. Tacit meanings are not conventional in the same way as 
linguistic meanings. 
5. Tacit meanings typical for art 
 
In Art as Experience John Dewey distinguishes between linguistic 
meanings typical for scientific texts and meanings typical for art 
(Dewey 1980, 82-105). He discusses mainly painting (poetry and 
literature are not considered). Science states meanings but art 
expresses meanings. One distinguishing feature is that meanings do 
not belong to the word intrinsically. Language is conventional and 
meanings are something external to the letters of words. In paintings 
the meanings are present in the picture; the meanings are 
incorporated or embodied in the canvas. Another distinguishing 
feature is that meanings in art are individualized. One change in the 
color, line, form and so on changes the meaning of the picture as a 
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whole. Linguistic meanings are what they are independently of the 
font, color of letters and so on. Linguistic meanings are abstract in a 
different sense than the meanings that are typical for art. This has to 
do with the concrete presence of meaning in art. A third important 
difference is that meanings in art are often emotionally powerful 
(this aspect is discussed in section 6). 
 
Dewey describes these differences in a few pages but does not give a 
definite theory of meaning that would explain them. There are only a 
couple of characterizations of meaning in his book, but one of them 
is quite informative. “The action and its consequence must be joined 
in perception. This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is 
the objective of all intelligence” (Dewey 1980, 44). This is, in effect, 
the same definition of meaning that Peirce gives: what a thing means 
is simply what habits it involves. The pragmatist notion of tacit 
(non-linguistic) meanings outlined above explains these features. 
Dewey’s characterization of meanings is also in accordance with the 
pragmatist definition of the object of knowledge. 
 
Tacit meanings are always present in any observed situation. 
Concrete objects of perception, such as chairs, windows, cows, trees 
and others, are sign-vehicles, carriers of meaning. And the meaning, 
the consequence of habitual action, belongs to the object of 
experience (and knowledge). Tacit meanings are interwoven with 
our concrete life practices. Linguistic meanings form a different and 
a more abstract layer in the system of meanings. Tacit meanings are 
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embodied in the concrete things we encounter when acting in the 
world. Paintings with their tacit meanings are closer to everyday 
experience than abstract linguistic meanings. In this sense the tacit 
meanings are embodied or incorporated in the picture. 
 
Tacit meanings are also individualized every time they are realized. 
A habit of action gives only a scheme or structure for conduct. The 
course of habitual action always depends heavily on the actual 
situation. The actual courses of conduct may vary a lot even though 
they are instances of the same habit. Tacit meanings also depend on 
the context in the sense that there are typically a large number of 
possibilities of action available in any situation. Even if these 
possibilities are not realized (they all simply cannot be) or 
consciously considered they add their part to the overall meaning of 
the situation. The scene of such situated activity is full of meanings. 
A situation is semantically dense. The same density of meanings 
applies to paintings. In this way, the meaning of a work of art as a 
whole is individualized. 
 
The claim that art expresses meanings is open to misinterpretations. 
Some aesthetic theories maintain that an artist expresses her inner 
mental life through an external object of art. This is something that 
Dewey would put into the category of “antiquated psychologies”. 
Meanings are ideas in the mind. Communication is transferring ideas 
into other minds using language. Since works of art like musical 
works are not related to conscious ideas in the same way as words, 
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the meanings in art and their communicativeness remain a mystery 
(Määttänen 2003). This view retains the internal/external dichotomy 
of classical philosophy. In Dewey’s aesthetics it is the meanings that 
are expressive as compared to those of a scientific text. This is not to 
deny the artists’ role in creating expressive works of art. The point is 
that the word “expresses” is used in a different sense and that the 
philosophical framework is different. 
 
The way out of the background assumptions of classical philosophy 
is indicated by Dewey’s distinction between the object of art and the 
work of art. This distinction is also vulnerable to misinterpretations 
because a work of art is usually considered to be a physical object, 
for example, a canvas hanging on a wall. In Dewey’s terminology a 
work of art is an experience, and experiences cannot hang anywhere. 
An object of art may hang on a wall, but the work of art is that 
object as experienced. And the work of art as an experience is not 
something private and internal mental state. Dewey consistently 
criticized this kind of mentalist psychology. Experience is 
interaction with the environment, and some experiences can be 
classified as aesthetic (see section 7). The point is that experience 
(as well as the mind) is a relation (or a system of relations) between 
a living organism and its environment. A work of art is realized in 
ongoing experience. 
 
Consider colors. They are experienced as properties of physical 
objects, but actually they are properties of interaction in the sense 
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that they also depend on internal conditions (internal to the body, 
that is). Light and a reflecting surface are not enough. There has to 
be a certain kind of biological organism with eyes and other neural 
structures. These three conditions make it seem that, in actual 
interaction, colors are experienced as external to the body. There is 
no need to speculate about colors residing literally in the head as 
phenomenal qualities. In a similar way emotions are experienced as 
internal (to the body), but as we shall see in section 6, in pragmatism 
they are analyzed as qualities of action. A work of art consists of 
(actually or potentially) experienced qualities and, as such, it is a 
relation between an organism and the object of art that is a cause 
(but not the only cause) of the experienced qualities. Art itself is “a 
quality of activity” (Dewey 1980, 224). 
 
An object of art is experienced as being expressive. Expressiveness 
is related to the character of tacit meanings typical for works of art. 
A work of art is an object of art as understood and interpreted with 
various kinds of meanings. This holds also for individual qualities. 
One cannot experience “pure” or “simple” qualities (Dewey 1980, 
121). A color as seen is qualified by “implicit reactions of many 
organs” (ibid., 122). Colors are charged with hidden consequences. 
In other words, even simple qualities are experienced as belonging 
to the whole that consists of the present situation, possibilities for 
action and the anticipated outcomes of habitual activity. This gives 
the qualities meaning precisely in the sense of the pragmatist notion 
of meaning defined above. 
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The origin of tacit meanings is ultimately from our evolutionary 
experience. This entails that these meaning structures function 
largely subconsciously. It is unthinkable that we could remember 
what kinds of experiences led to the development of our sense 
organs, for example. However, these experiences have left their 
trace in the structure and mechanisms of our biological bodies and 
therefore effect how we experience, understand and interpret our 
environment. 
 
Meanings, by definition, can be used in thinking and 
communication. The fact that the tacit meanings of art function 
largely subconsciously does not prevent this. That subconscious 
cognitive processes exist is simply an empirical fact. Without any 
closer analysis there is a temptation to be content with concepts like 
intuition, creativity and the like. The pragmatist notion of tacit 
meanings is one attempt to describe the mechanisms of subconscious 
cognition. 
 
Communication with subconscious tacit meanings is perfectly 
possible and, ultimately, it is not so different in comparison with 
writing a text. Recall the distinction between an object of art and a 
work of art as an experience. An artist works with the object of art 
using her own experience of it as a standard. She is finished when 
she is satisfied with her own experience. The object of art is then 
removed to a gallery, for example. Note that a work of art is not an 
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entity that can be removed. Other people come to experience that 
object of art. Their experiences are similar to the extent they have 
common background. The tacit meanings of art are effective in 
communication precisely because their ultimate origin is our 
evolutionary experience. Historically and culturally established 
meanings have, of course, their role in experiencing art, and their 
effectiveness in communication is also based on a shared human 
background. 
 
Writing a text is not so different. An author produces a text, rewrites 
it until the long rows and groups of letters state the meanings the 
author wants to convey. The reader has nothing but the letters plus 
her own background of reading and writing. Communication is 
successful to the extent that the author and the reader share a 
common background of meanings. But meanings, thought contents 
and experiences are not entities that can be removed from one place 
to another. They are created anew at each moment. A skilful artist 
and a skilful writer are able to control the experiences of other 
people in the direction (or directions) they want. 
 




Antonio Damasio (1995) has put forth a hypothesis that he calls the 
somatic marker hypothesis. According to it emotions are signs of 
values. It proves to be useful in explaining why an aesthetic 
experience (in Dewey’s sense) is emotionally charged. Damasio’s 
views fit well with the pragmatist notion of meaning. 
6.1 Facts and values in pragmatism 
 
One of the misleading dichotomies in the classical philosophy is the 
dualism between facts and values. David Hume, in considering a 
murder, concluded that there are only certain passions, motives, 
volitions and thoughts but no other facts that could be called vice 
(Hume 1978, 468). On the next page he presents the famous 
principle: no ought from is. These places in Hume’s book are quoted 
quite often. 
 
Between these passages Hume writes that vice and virtue are like 
sounds, colors, heat and cold in that they “are not qualities in 
objects, but perceptions in the mind” (Hume 1978, 469). This 
sentence is not so often quoted. It is, however, important because it 
reveals the metaphysical framework of Hume’s thought. This kind 
of dichotomy of external and internal is not tenable in consistent 
naturalism. Heat as molecular movement, as the current definition 
says, is obviously a property of sun, for example. And, as Hilary 
Putnam points out, Hume advocates a kind of pictorial semantics 
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(Putnam 2004, 15). If something cannot be literally perceived here 
and now, it cannot belong to the world of facts. Hume’s concept of 
experience admits only perceptions of particular sense qualities. 
 
In pragmatism the notion of experience is different, as is the notion 
of fact. In pragmatism the world is not experienced as sense 
qualities. The world is experienced as possibilities for action that 
lead to anticipated consequences. Accordingly, facts consist of the 
relation between what is observed here and now and what will be 
observed later as a consequence of certain kind of conduct. Ongoing 
activity is the essential feature of experience. Action is possible only 
on a timeline where outcomes of action can be anticipated (not 
necessarily consciously) on the basis of past experience. 
 
This viewpoint changes the relation between facts and values. The 
world is full of possibilities for action, and only one or two activities 
are usually possible at one time. This entails the need to choose 
between various courses of conduct. And choice is, in effect, 
valuation. Some anticipated outcomes are valued more than the 
others. These values and the choices based on them are, of course, at 
different levels. Analogously with the system of meanings, value 
theory also requires a bottom-up analysis. This is the exact contrary 
to the classical tradition which maintains that values come ultimately 
from theology or pure conceptual analysis, moral Mount Sinai, or 
out of the a priori blue, as Dewey put it. 
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Naturalism puts human beings in nature where biological organisms 
are born, live their lives and die. Live creatures have the interesting 
feature that they tend to live their life until it eventually ends. In fact, 
there is no choice about that. Another easily observable fact is that 
live creatures usually strive to survive. And in order to survive one 
must breath, have water and food, shelter, and so on. This striving 
creates a natural source of norms that I have called biotechnical 
normativity (Määttänen 2012). In order to continue one’s life one 
has to make certain choices. These choices are based on the 
valuation of the expected outcomes of action. A hungry animal 
values food because she expects to experience something positive 
after eating it. Experienced satisfaction of hunger is a positive value 
for all animals and it is, pace Hume, an observable fact in nature. 
Human beings with history and culture also have other normative 
structures. In a bottom-up analysis, they are constructed on the basis 
of the biotechnical normativity that provides an objective basis also 
for other values. 
 
The outcome of the analysis above is that facts and values are not 
separable into different realms of being. For an acting agent, facts 
and values are intertwined. An acting agent is necessarily a valuing 
agent. 
6.2 Meaningful emotions 
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Emotions are experienced as internal states. As such, they are 
sometimes regarded as causes of action. In William James’s 
example a man is running away from a bear. According to James the 
actual cause of running is the bear, not the fear. The fear qualifies 
the running; it is a quality of action. Emotions have an object even if 
it is not consciously recognized. In other words, emotions are 
meaningful. The pragmatist notion of meaning explains this. Any 
object of perception may involve habits. These habits offer 
anticipations of the possible consequences of dealing with that 
object of perception. These consequences simply are the meaning of 
the object. 
 
In Damasio’s view, emotions are meaningful signs (somatic 
markers) of values (Damasio 1995). He maintains that emotions are 
necessary aids of rational cognition. Alternative courses of action 
cannot usually be calculated so well that rational choice could be 
based solely on them. Time and cognitive resources are limited. 
Damasio describes extreme cases where persons tend to make 
calculations that are too extensive. According to him these persons 
have Kantian minds that resemble patients with damages in the 
frontal lobe. Emotions help us make choices by indicating that it is 
time to stop calculations. Negative emotions advice immediate 
avoidance and positive emotions indicate the need to concentrate on 
how the object of emotion might be accessed. For Damasio emotions 
are heuristic aids of rational thought. 
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The pragmatist notion of meaning contains the idea that habits are 
tacit meanings and, as such, they are vehicles of rational thought. As 
pointed out above, the background of tacit meanings is our long 
evolutionary experience. Objects and features of the environment, 
with which we associate habits sometimes consciously but most 
often subconsciously, thus have meanings on the basis of all the 
experiences encountered as outcomes of these habitual activities. It 
is evident that we cannot consciously analyze and recollect the 
evolutionary history of these experiences. However, they have left 
their trace in the mechanisms of subconscious cognition with tacit 
meanings and emotions involved here. But the experiences have left 
a memory trace as their summary. And this also holds for single 
sense qualities. We cannot experience “pure” or “simple” qualities. 
They are charged with hidden consequences and, therefore, also with 
an emotional flavor based on subconscious valuation. It is not 
accidental that red is experienced differently than blue or green. This 
is obviously related to the different role of these colors in our 
evolutionary history. 
 
Dewey discussed this emotional charge and, for some reason, used 
in this context the German world Gefühlston, a tone of feeling 
(Dewey 1975b, 188). Single experienced qualities also have this 
Gefühlston that carries with it memories of past experiences. 
Emotions are signs of values. The pragmatist notion of meaning is 
an explicit account of how this sign-relation actually functions. 
Habitual ways of having experiences help to anticipate what sort of 
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experiences can be expected given the presence of certain qualities, 
objects and combinations of them. Positively valued experiences 
promote positive emotions and negatively valued outcomes promote 
negative emotions. Habits as tacit meanings are vehicles of 
cognition and the outcome of these subconscious cognitive 
processes become conscious as emotions, as a Gefühlston. 
 
7. Aesthetic experience in pragmatism. 
 
The basic aim of pragmatist aesthetics is to recover the connection 
between art and life. Crudely speaking, the concept and the practices 
of fine art (or polite arts for the polite classes, as was also suggested) 
were created in the 1800th century when the bourgeoisie removed 
paintings and statues to museums and galleries and developed a 
corresponding aesthetic theory with its principal concept of pure 
disinterested beauty (Mortensen 1997, Shiner 2001). The notion of 
pure disinterested beauty is not utterly wrong. It expresses 
something that is true about experiencing art. Enjoyment offered by 
art does not have direct relation to the interests of everyday 
practices. It is often emotionally powerful without any clear 
connection to specific things that might be causing these emotions. 
However, all this can be explained without appealing to the 
philosophical background assumptions of classical philosophy. 
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John Dewey emphasized the continuity between everyday 
experiences and art. Recall that Dewey defined a work of art as an 
experience produced by an object of art. Dewey’s notion of aesthetic 
experience is not introduced as a tool for sharp categorization of fine 
art as something separate from other experiences. Art has no 
privilege concerning aesthetic experiences. Objects and things 
outside the artworld are also capable of being experienced 
aesthetically. Dewey uses also the concept of an experience with the 
emphasis on the article. The purpose of this emphasis is to point out 
that the experience is in some sense exceptional, worthy to 
remember, but maybe not quite an aesthetic experience. It is an 
experience with some aesthetic quality. This continuum of concepts 
expresses the continuum between fine art and everyday life. 
 
The central feature of an aesthetic experience in Dewey’s sense is its 
consummatory character. It is in some sense finished and complete. 
It is valuable in itself, not as a means for other experiences. Its value 
is positive, but this is not tied to any specific concept like beauty or 
the sublime. The definition is in this sense formal. The content of the 
experience may vary. It may be beautiful or ugly, pleasurable or 
fearful. The point is that it is pursued for its own sake. Stendhal 
suggested that beauty is a promise of happiness. At a more general 
level we can say that an aesthetic experience is a promise of 
consummation, and this promise is enjoyable in itself. 
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The fact that an aesthetic experience is only a promise of actual 
consummation entails that it is not directly connected to action. It is 
not merely a means for other experiences. There is a difference 
between musical experiences and ticket buying experiences 
sometimes necessary for getting into a concert. Ticket buying is a 
clear means for a musical experience that is valuable as such. It is a 
perceptual experience, only a promise of real consummation to 
which action might lead. This can be called relative 
disinterestedness. It is only relative because the connection to action 
and practice is not completely broken. Basically this follows from 
the processes of understanding and interpreting. All experiences are 
understood and interpreted as meaningful in some way or degree, 
and in pragmatism these meanings are ultimately habitual activities. 
The vehicles of understanding are practical and therefore connected 
with the goals and interests of life in general. Disinterestedness is 
relative also in the sense that aesthetic experiences may be means for 
cultivation of personality, they often have a social function, and so 
on. 
 
The emotional power of an aesthetic experience is also explained by 
the connection with habits as meanings. Emotions are signs of 
values, but the Gefühlston of perceived qualities of the works of art 
is based on the long forgotten experience of our evolutionary 
history. No conscious meanings can necessarily be attached to 
qualities, but this is a consequence of the subconscious character of 
the tacit meaning structures that are typical for works of art. What 
30 
can be consciously manipulated is the emotionally charged aesthetic 
experience, and that is what composers and performers do using 
their own experience as a model. That is how one communicates: 
using tacit meanings that have subconscious referents. 
 
Subconscious meanings do refer to past experiences that have 
shaped our sense organs, cognitive and emotional mechanisms. And 
the overall subconscious valuation of the referents of these meanings 
becomes conscious as emotions. Therefore music, for example, is 
meaningful just because of this (tacit) reference, contrary to what 
Mark Johnson writes (Johnson 2007, 242-243). According to 
Johnson music is meaningful but does not refer. That is true if the 
meanings are supposed to be conscious. However, Peirce’s explicit 
definition of meanings as habits of action gives a basis for 
suggesting a system of tacit and largely subconscious meanings that 
do refer. As Dewey pointed out, even single perceptual qualities are 
charged with hidden consequences that constitute the meaning and 
the related Gefühlston of these qualities. 
 
Aristotle distinguished between praxis and poiesis by saying that the 
goal, telos, of poiesis is something external to the activity while the 
goal of praxis is the activity itself (Aristotle 1999, 1140b 5-10). The 
paradigmatic example of praxis is eudaimonia, the good life. 
Aesthetic experiences are something that are pursued for their own 
sake, and therefore they are also suitable elements of Aristotelian 
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